The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision ("the Committee") released a consultative document that included a regulatory capital charge for operational risk. The complexity of the object "operational risk" led from the time of the document's release to vigorous and recurring discussions. We show that for a production unit of a bank with well-defined workflow processes where a comprehensive self-assessment based on six risk factors has been carried out, operational risk can be unambiguously defined and modelled. Using techniques from extreme value theory, we calculate risk measures for independent and dependent risk factors, respectively. The results of this modelling exercise are relevant for the implementation of a risk management framework: Frequency dependence among the risk factors only slightly changes the independency results, severity dependence on the contrary changes the independency results significantly, the risk factor "fraud" dominates all other factors and finally, only 10 percent of all processes have a 98 percent contribution to the resulting VaR. Since the definition and maintenance of processes is very costly, this last results is of major practical relevance. Performing a sensitivity analysis, it turns out that the key 10% of relevant processes is rather robust under this stress testing.
Introduction
In June 1999, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision ("the Committee") released its consultative document "The New Basel Capital Accord" ("The Accord") that included a proposed regulatory capital charge to cover "other risks". Operational risk (OR) is such an "other risk". From the time of the release of this document and its sequels (BIS (2001) ), the industry and the regulatory authorities have been engaged in vigorous and recurring discussions. It is fair to say, that at the moment the philosopher's stone concerning operational risk has not been found. Some of the discussions are on a rather general and abstract level. For example, there is still ongoing debate concerning a general definition of OR. The one adopted in the Accord is "the risk of direct or indirect loss resulting form inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events." How to translate the above definition into a capital charge for OR is not yet fully resolved; see for instance Danielsson et al. (2001) . For the moment, legal risk is included in the definition, however strategic and reputational risk are not.
In this paper, we do not attempt to make a contribution to these more general debates, we concentrate on some practical quantification issues. Using comprehensive self-assessment data from a bank's production unit, we try to answer the following questions quantitatively:
1. Can we define and model OR for work flow processes of a production unit of a bank (production processes for short)? A production process is roughly a sequence of business activities; for a definition, see the beginning of Section 2.
Is a portfolio view feasible and what are the assets?
3. Which possible assessment errors matter?
4. Can we model OR such that not only the risk exposure but also the causes are identified? In other words, not only risk measurement but risk management is the ultimate goal.
5. Which are the important risk factors? How does dependence among the risk factors affect the losses?
6. How important is comprehensiveness? Do all the 103 production processes in our data sample significantly contribute to the operational risk of the business unit?
The most important and difficult task in the quantification of operational risk is to find a reasonable model for the business activities. We found it useful, both for practice as well as for theoretical reasons, to think of quantifiable operational risk in terms of graphs. Though this approach is not really essential in this paper, where only an overall risk exposure on an aggregated graph level is derived and analysed, for operational risk management full fledged graph theory is crucial. This approach of considering first an aggregated level turns out to be essential from a feasibility point of view: Only a small number of all graphs significantly contribute to the risk exposure and should then be considered in more detail in a second step. Since operational risk management is the ultimate goal, we first start with a brief outline of this graph theoretic language. Then, within this needed context, a definition of operational risk is given which is in line with the Accord's definition and variants of it. A first goal in our approach is to well define all objects in the definition. Next we model all relevant processes as a function of the following threat or risk factors: system failure, temporary loss of staff, theft, fraud, error and external catastrophes. We assume in a first model that these factors are independent. This model defines a benchmark. In a second model, dependence among the risk factors is introduced. To achieve these goals, Poisson processes (for the stochastic time of a loss event occurrence) and scaled Beta distributions (for the severities of the losses) are used. The results show that we can give reasonable answers to all questions raised above. More specifically, if operational risk is modelled on well-defined objects all vagueness vanishes although, compared with market or credit risk, a different methodology and different statistical techniques are used. From a practitioners point of view an important insight is that not all processes in an organization need to be equally considered for the purpose of defining accurately the operational risk exposure. Management of operational risks can focus on key issues; a selection of the relevant processes reduces significantly the costs of defining and designing the workflow items (in our example, out of 103 processes only 11 are needed to estimate the risk figures at a 90 percent level of accuracy). Second, although six risk factors were considered, only 2 of them seem to really matter. Thought these results are based on the (comprehensive) data at hand and the methodology used, we believe them to be true more generally. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the models. First, a simple model where risk factors are independent and then a more advanced model allowing for dependence are presented. In Section 3 the results using the data available are discussed and compared for the two models. In the last section, we summarize our findings.
Modelling Operational Risk
We consider production activities of a bank like the process of account opening, all payment services, account processing or all kinds of settlement and netting. These activities can be described and managed if they are considered as time ordered processes. For example, the production processes in the organisation unit "Production" can be classified into management processes, pure production processes and controlling processes. We only consider the pure production processes in the sequel (production processes for short). Given such processes, we use (time) directed graphs for the mathematical model in order to highlight the basic structure (see Figure 1 for an example and Ebnöther (2001) for a deeper mathematical analysis).
Insert Figure 1 around here.
That is, a process is modelled as a graph G, i.e. a set of nodes k ∈ K ⊂ N and a set of directed edges e ∈ E ⊂ N × N , with N the set of natural numbers 1 . Formally, for graphs,
where k i , k i+1 is the directed edge connecting the nodes k i and k i+1 . Given this skeleton, we next attach risk information. To this end, we use the following facts: At each node, which represents a machine or a person say, errors in the processing can occur. The errors have a cause and an effect R on the performance of the process. More precisely, at each node there is a (random) input of information defining the performance. The errors then affect this input leading to a random output performance. The causes at a node are the risk factors and their action on the processing performance are modelled by random variables R 1 , R 2 , ... . Examples of causes are fraud, theft or computer system failure. We associate the information of the risk factors (the causes) to the nodes of the graph. The effect of the causes is associated to the outgoing edges. The primary objective is to model the link which associates effects to causes. There are of course numerous ways in which such a link can be defined. As operational risk management is basically loss-management, our prime concern is finding out how causes, through the underlying risk factors, impact losses at individual edges. In our probabilistic approach, a loss distribution P ki,ki+1 is associated with each edge, leading to the global loss distribution P G for the whole graph, i.e. process.
We call the distribution P G the operations risk distribution. In our modelling approach, we distinguish this distribution from the operational risk distribution (see Figure 2) . While the operations risk distribution is defined for all losses, the operational risk distribution considers only losses larger than a given threshold.
Insert Figure 2 around here.
Operational risk modelling, as defined by the Accord, corresponds to the operations risk distribution in our setup. In practice, this identification is of little value as every bank clearly distinguishes between small and large losses. First, small losses are frequent but there are very few large losses. This implies that banks know a lot about the small losses and their causes but they have no experience with large losses. Hence, typically an efficient organization exists for small losses and no further modelling at all is needed. Therefore, the value added of quantitative operational risk management for banks lies in the domain of large losses (low intensity, high severity). This is the reason, why we differentiate between operations and operational risk.
Definition 1 Operational risk for a set of production processes are those operations risks associated with these processes which can be quantified and presented on a directed graph and which exceed a given threshold value.
Though this definition seems a bit pedantic, it stresses the fact that we concentrate our analysis on well defined processes (hence the graph theoretic language) with resulting losses exceeding some minimal, preset values.
Whether or not we can use graph theory to calculate operational risk critically depends on the existence of standardized and stable processes within the banking firm. The cost of defining processes within a bank can be prohibitively large if (i) all processes need to be defined, (ii) if they are defined on a very deep level of aggregation and (iii) they are not stable over time. A result from this paper is that only a fraction of processes needs to be defined to measure operational risk to a high level of accuracy. Hence, the costs for doing the necessary work to measure operational risk can be significantly reduced if one first concentrates on selecting the important processes.
An important issue in operational risk is data availability. The data we use in the applications below are based on expert knowledge (i.e. self-assessment) . More precisely, the risk of each production process was valued by the respective process owner. To achieve this, standardized forms were used where all entries in the questionnaire were properly defined. Suppose for example, that the occurrence probability of an event for a risk factor can be valued "high/medium/low" by the expert. Then, the "medium"-class might comprise 1-year events up to 4-year events. If we use expert data, we usually possess data to fully specify the risk information. The disadvantage of such data concerns their confidentiality. As Rabin (1998) lucidly demonstrates in his review article, people typically fail to apply the mathematical laws of probability correctly but instead create own "laws" such as the so-called "law of small numbers". Therefore, an expert based data base (i) needs to be designed such that the most important and prominent biases are circumvented and (ii) a sensitivity analysis has do be done. We therefore never asked the experts to choose a number for a probability but -as in the example above -asked them to make a choice between different real life situations which are more unambiguously defined. To satisfy the second point, we check the models' sensitivity below. For example, we analyze the impact on the results if "all experts underestimated the occurrence probability by one class". For the severity self-assessment, the experts had to estimate maximum and minimum possible losses in their respective processes.
Minimal Dependence Model
Within the above framework, the following steps summarise our quantitative approach to OR:
1. First, data are generated through simulation starting from expert knowledge.
2. Second, the distribution for heavy losses is modelled and estimated. Extreme Value Theory (EVT) turns out to be a useful tool.
3. Key risk figures are calculated for the chosen risk measures. We calculate the VaR and the conditional VaR (CVaR).
A sensitivity analysis is performed.
Consider a business unit of a bank with some production processes G i . We assume that for process i there are six risk factors R i,j , j = 1, ..., 6, leading to a possible process malfunction: System failure, external catastrophes, theft, fraud, error and temporary loss of staff. In Model 1, we assume that all risk factors are independent.
To generate the data we have to simulate two risk processes: The stochastic time of a loss event occurrence and the stochastic loss amount (the severity) of an event expressed in a given currency. The number N i,j of process i malfunctions by risk factor j and the associated per event severity W i,j (n), n = 1, ...N i,j , have to be related to expert knowledge. We assume that N i,j is described by a homogeneous Poisson process and that the severity W i,j (n) is modelled by a Beta distribution. Formally, the inter-arrival times between successive losses are i.i.d. exponentially distributed with finite mean 1/λ i,j . As a consequence the counting process N i,j (t) is a homogeneous Poisson process with intensity λ i,j > 0 and
The parameters λ i,j are calibrated to the expert knowledge data base. The severity distributions W i,j (n) ∼ F i,j , for n = 1, . . . , N i,j (t) are estimated in a second step, where we assume in this section that F i,j follow a Beta distribution between the self-assessed maximum and minimum losses. If the (i, j)-th loss arrival process {N i,j (t), t ≥ 0} is independent from the loss severity process {W i,j (n)} n∈N and W i,j (n) has the same distribution for each n and are independent, then
is called a compound Poisson process. It represents the total loss experienced by process i due to risk type j up to time t. So far, the process dependent risk factors R i,j where only defined in a rather loose sense. We will make this meaning precise now by setting R i,j = S i,j (T ) at some fixed time T . In our applications we fix the time to one year but each bank can choose this time individually. If we further assume that the loss processes {S i,j (t), t ≥ 0} are independent as a function of i, j, then one easily shows that the global loss process
is again a compound Poisson process and hence can be represented as
where
Throughout, the notation N (t) ∼ Poisson(λ) means that {N (t), t ≥ 0} is a homogeneous Poisson process with intensity λ > 0, moreover for a random variable X, X ∼ F means that X has distribution function F , i.e. P (X ≤ x) = F (x). Therefore, the l-th severity variable W (l) possesses a mixture distribution. We always simulate 1 year. For example, 1000 simulations of S(1) means that we simulate the total first years loss 1000 times. In summary, for each risk factor j in the process i and certain λ i,j , the total damage S i,j (t) has distribution
with * the convolution operator. The next step is a simulation of the tail of the loss distribution as we are typically interested in heavy losses in operational risk management. Hence, a threshold u has to be chosen which separates the heavy loss region we are interested in from the "unimportant" losses. To get some intuition for the distribution in the heavy-loss region, we plot with our simulated data the empirical estimate e 1 (u) = E(S(1) − u|S(1) ≥ u) for 1 year.
This function, the mean-excess function, is by our definition of operational risk a useful measure of risk. A typical plot is shown in Figure 4 . From EVT, see Embrechts, Klüppelberg and Mikosch (1997) , we know that for typically heavy tailed distributions like Pareto type distributions, e 1 (u) is a linearly increasing function. For heavy tailed data, the empirical estimate e 1,n (u) of e 1 (u) typically behaves approximatively linearly increasing from some high threshold value u onwards. EVT uses this fact to model tails of distributions through the generalized Pareto distribution (GPD) G. The GPD is a two-parameter distribution with distribution function
where σ > 0 and the support is [0, ∞) when ξ ≥ 0 and [0, −σ/ξ] for ξ < 0. Of course, using Monte Carlo simulation, we could simulate as much data as we want. But extreme value theory offers some refinement over empirical quantile estimation and allows us to "smooth the tail" of the loss distribution. Also, the same method can be used whenever sufficient real loss data become available.
The theoretical motivation to use the GPD is the Pickands-Balkema-de Haan Theorem; see Embrechts, Klüppelberg and Mikosch (1997) , Theorem 3.4.13 for details. Further examples of the use of EVT within risk management can be found in Embrechts (2000) . At this point it is important to stress that EVT, and hence a GPD-based tail fit, is not just confined to Pareto-type heavy tailed data. The latter typically corresponds to ξ > 0 in the definition of the GPD. EVT (through ξ = 0 and ξ < 0) allows also for the modelling of extremes in light tailed situations. The construction of an operational risk measure, at a yearly horizon, say, should be clear now. After the various processes are defined, we ask for expert estimates on the loss-range. Through the expert estimates on λ i,j we obtain a distribution of W (l) above. Finally, under the independence assumptions above, it is straightforward to simulate S(t), an example is given in Figure 3 . As we are mainly interested in the tail of the distribution of S(t), we use EVT to obtain a tail fit. At this point, we could of course have used several other tools like Panjer recursion, Fast Fourier Transform or non-parametric tail estimates, say. The EVT approach is however fairly model independent, i.e. as soon as we have sufficiently many observations on S(t), this procedure can be put into place. No doubt, other methods will have to be investigated at a later stage. The so-called Peaks-Over-Threshold (POT) method based on a GPD model allows to construct a tail fit like in Figure 3 above a certain threshold u; for details of the method, see the papers in Embrechts (2000) . The Beta-mixture compound Poisson model is of course (from a theoretical point of view) light tailed; this is reflected in the point estimateξ = −0.0125 being negative. Once more, EVT would find a good fit regardless of the tail property: ξ > 0 (heavy tailed, Pareto type), ξ = 0 (medium tailed, Gumbel type), ξ < 0 (light tailed, Weibull type).
Insert Figure 3 around here.
In summary, Model 1 (no dependence) is specified by:
• The production processes are represented as condensed, directed graphs consisting of two nodes and a single edge.
• Six independent risk factors are chosen.
• The stochastic arrival time of loss events is modelled using a Poisson homogeneous process and the severity of losses by a Beta distribution. Using the assumption of independence, this yields a compound Poisson model for the aggregated losses.
• It turns out that the generalised Pareto fit through the POT method yields an excellent fit to the tail of the aggregate loss distribution.
• The distribution parameters are determined using maximum likelihood estimation techniques.
In Section 3 we will come back to the data underlying Figure 3 and discuss in detail the resulting operational risk measures.
Modelling Dependence
In Model 1 we assumed independence of the risk factors. We relax this strong assumption in this section. Dependence in Model 2 is introduced though a socalled common shock model. This approach goes for instance back to reliability modelling of technical systems; see Bedford and Cooke (2001) , Chapter 8. Our approach is based on Lindskog and McNeil (2001) where applications to finance, in particular to credit risk modelling, are discussed. A natural approach to modelling this dependence is to assume that all losses can be related to a series of underlying and independent shock processes. When a shock occurs this may cause losses of several different types (risk factors). In our Model 2 approach, we model dependence between occurrence times within the risk factors system failures, external catastrophes, and temporary loss of staff. Typical shocks for external catastrophes are earthquakes. The other three risk factors (theft, fraud, and human error) are still assumed to be independent.
The dependencies are modelled as follows. For external catastrophes it is assumed that an event realization hitting a process also affects all other processes (such as an earthquake for example). Systems are ordered in three hierarchies "LOW/MEDIUM/HIGH" as follows: A system is in the class "LOW" if in the self-assessment the probability of a failure was rated "low" and the same holds for the classes "MEDIUM" and "HIGH". At a next stage, three states 1, 2 and 3 are defined. If 1 is realized, all systems in the three hierarchy classes fail, if 2 is realized failure occurs by the systems in "MEDIUM" and "HIGH" and if 3 is realized only in the systems in "HIGH". The frequencies of the states 1, 2, 3 are determined using the following consistency conditions: The frequency has to be consistent with the individual system frequency of the self-assessment and the defined dependency structure. The idea behind these dependencies is that the more important a system is (for example a host system), the better defined are the measures to avoid a system failure but on the other hand, if such a system fails, systems which depend on the host also fail. The temporary loss of staff dependency is modelled in the same way.
The mathematical model is defined as follows. Suppose there are m different, independent type of shocks or events, s = 1, . . . , m. For every s, let
be a homogeneous Poisson process with intensity λ (s) recording the number of shocks of type s occurring in (0, t] . Assume further that these shock counting processes are independent. Furthermore,
denotes the counting process over all shock event classes. The frequency of losses of the processes j = 1, . . . , n is fixed by the counting process
At the r-th occurrence of an event of type s the Bernoulli variable I for r = 1, . . . , N (s) (t) are considered to be independent and identically distributed with a multivariate Bernoulli distribution
independent of the Poisson process { N (t), t ≥ 0}. It follows that
The components of the vector (N 1 (t) for r = 1, ..., N (s) . The aggregate loss for losses of type j is a compound Poisson process given by
In our setup, randomness enters in two ways: As the stochastic time of an event realization and the stochastic loss (severity). The model above can be applied to either of these cases. One nice feature of this model is that we can calculate correlations either if frequencies are dependent or if severities are dependent. See Lindskog and McNeil (2001) for details of the model.
An Application
The data set for the application of the above approaches is based on 103 production processes at Zurich Kantonalbank and self-assessment of the probability and severity of losses of six risk factors (see Section 2.1). Since confidentiality prevents us presenting real values, the absolute values of all results are fictitious but the relative magnitudes are real. The calculations are based on 1000 simulations. In Table 1 results for Model 1 are shown. From Table 1 and Figure 3 we see that the POT model yields a reasonable tail fit, also for the higher threshold u = 208. Figures 4 and 5 yield further information on the underlying loss tail behaviour (Figure 4 ) and the statistical uncertainty of the estimated parameters ( Figure 5 ). For further interpretation of these, see Embrechts (2000) .
From Table 1 roughly follows that, given a threshold, the VaR and CVaR on the 1 percent level are twice up to four time the threshold value. These estimates will enter the premium calculation of operational risk insurance. Note that in the Accord, the Committee states under "Insurance": As the Committee correctly states, the market for insurance of operational risk is still developing. Whether or not insurance contracts will be used in the future to cover operational risk depends on other factors too, such as potentially asymmetric information and the magnitude of fair premia.
The question, how much each of the 103 processes contributes to the risk exposure is relevant for practitioners. If it turns out that only a fraction of all processes significantly contributes to the risk exposure, risk management needs only to be defined for these processes. To answer the question, the total VaR contribution of the most important 10 process is considered: It follows, that these 10 processes lead to a VaR of 98% of the VaR calculated from all processes as shown in Table 1 .
Insert Figure 6 around here.
Hence, it is not necessary to consider all processes but selecting the most important ones is sufficient. This finding lowers costs in managing operational risk significantly for the banking firm.
We next consider the importance of a portfolio setup. To achieve this, first the relative contribution of each single process on the 95%-VaR level is calculated (see Figure 6 ). The sum of these individual contribution is then compared with the joint VaR of all 103. It follows, that the empirical VaR on the 95% level in Table 1 is 1.4 times smaller than the sum over all single VaR contributions. Hence, there is even in this minimal dependence model a significant diversification effect. This example therefore shows, that a portfolio view may also play a dominant role for operational risk measurement and management. We next compare the above results with these coming from Model 2. In this model the frequencies of system failures, external catastrophes and temporary loss of staff are dependent. Table 2 summarizes the findings.
In the calculation of VaR and CVaR for Model 2, we maintained the percentage of events over the threshold. It turns out that the thresholds only slightly change if dependence is considered (the second threshold by coincidence is the same as in Model 1). Overall, dependence of the three risk factors system failure, temporary loss of staff and external catastrophes only changes the capital at risk of the independence model slightly. Given the usual wisdom in finance, that dependence has a strong impact, this result is surprising at first sight. But there is a simple explanation for this fact. It follows that the dominant risk factor is fraud 2 . But fraud is still assumed independent in Model 2. As a next step, we therefore assumed that the fraud frequencies are also dependent. Then the risk quantities in Table 1 increased by 15 to 20 percent. Therefore, also if all risk factor are temporally dependent, the impact on risk is not very strong.
The next issue is the sensitivity analysis. For Model 1, Table 3 summarizes some results.
Original situation x = 268 y = 392
Only the 15 processes with the largest possible severities 0.94 x 0.98 y
Underestimating maximum loss by 20% in all processes 1.2 x 1.28 y
Overestimating maximum loss by 20% in all processes 0.86 x 0.89 y System failure is more probable than the experts assume 1.4 x 1.73 y
Loss from system failure is twice as high as assumed 1.02 x 1.01 y Loss from fraud is twice as high as assumed 2.1 x 2.23 y Table 3 : Sensitivity analysis for Model 1 (the case u = 100 in Table 1 ), 1000 Simulations. We compare the smoothed VaR from the given situation with VaR estimates under some stress scenarios.
It follows from Table 3 that misjudgement of some factors has little impact on operational risk of the production unit. But in two cases the outcome is sensitive to the experts' self-assessment: The underestimation of losses due to fraud and the underestimation of the probability of system failure. These findings are in line with the dependency analysis results since fraud and system failure are the most important risk factors. A crucial question is: Are the results shown in Figure 6 robust under the above sensitivity analysis?
Insert Figure 7 around here.
In Figure 7 the mean contribution and its standard deviation of the processes to the total VaR are shown. The figures are calculated considering all different cases in Table 3 . All processes which vary less than 0.01 percent in their mean and standard deviation are not shown in Figure 7 . It follows that, even for the most significant factors in the sensitivity analysis, the number of processes which significantly contribute to the VaR remains almost invariant and small compared to all processes. The final sensitivity analysis is more fundamental than the one considered above. It considers the estimate of the maximum potential loss an event can induce in a process. The numbers delivered by experts for all risk factors and all processes result from complex reasoning: The experts figure out what can be the worst event happening, what will be the resulting damage and how the existing risk -or catastrophy organization will prevent and reduce the losses. Suppose, that this self-assessment is not feasible. Then the upper bound loss information is missing and a model needs to generate the data. Analysis of (few) real data losses have indicated that a Pareto distribution often gives a reasonable fit. If we carry out the calculations for Model 1, it follows that a reasonable threshold is at u = 4000. The corresponding estimate for V aR 99% is 7899, i.e. 20 times larger as the V aR 99% for the Beta approach. This example shows that generation of missing information using statistical models needs to be done very carefully since it can induce unrealistic results. The intuition for the large number obtained is the following. Consider the process "opening of a bank account". The self-assessment estimate of the maximum potential loss should be smaller than say 1 million CHF to be reasonable. Suppose, that we replace this bound with the Pareto distribution. Then, a loss of say 7 billion CHF for the opening of a bank account is theoretically possible, although with a very low probability within the next 1000 years (i.e. number of simulations) . In fact, if one analyses the data generated in the course of a simulation, there are a small number of events which cause enormous losses and hence drive the VaR up. Does it make sense to consider such events? Clearly, it is possible to design a fictitious scenario in a fairly simple process such as the opening of a bank account which could lead to disastrous losses if this event is the cause of further events that in a chain reaction lead to some kind of disaster. In such a context, the concept operational risk has no longer any content since the statement that "with a certain probability the loss due to operational risk is at least as large as the value of the bank" is always true. Furthermore, such a loss potential can neither be managed nor can this risk be mitigated. A reasonable solution to the problem that a maximum loss can not be assessed is to use a mixture of a Beta and a Gamma distribution. In a first step a number of events (1000 events in our case) are drawn from a Beta distribution and then a Gamma distribution is fitted using these points. Hence, we maintain the reasonable properties in the low severity region but losses can nevertheless become arbitrary large. In other words, the maximum loss used to draw the points from the Beta distribution can be interpreted as an uncertain self-assessment when the Gamma distribution is used in a second step. The results in Table 4 confirm that this model leads to plausible results for the VaR and the CVaR. Table 4 : Data for Model 1 with a mixture of a Beta and a Gamma distribution for the severity. "Empirical" denotes the results derived from 1000 simulations for the Beta-Gamma mixture model. The line (u = 217; #100) corresponds to estimates from a POT model fit to the empirical data based on a threshold of u = 217 and 100 observations out of the 1000 are above this level.
To compare the results of the Beta-Gamma mixture model with the original Model 1, the number of observations above the threshold should be kept the same (100 in Tables 1 and 4) in both cases. It follows, that the VaR values are only slightly larger in the case where losses can be arbitrary high but that the CVaR values are, for high α-values, about 20 percent larger than in Model 1. Hence, the critical value is almost unchanged but some high high losses occur which shift the mean value of losses larger than the VaR significantly upwards.
Conclusions
The scope of this paper was to show that quantification of operational risk, adapted to the needs of business units, is feasible if (i) data exist and (ii) if the modelling problem is seriously considered. This means, that the solution of the problem is described with the appropriate tools and not by an ad hoc use of methods successfully developed for other risks.
It follows from the results presented, that a quantification of OR and OR management must be based on well defined objects (processes in our case). We do not see the possibility to quantify OR if such a structure is missing in a bank. It also follows that not all objects (processes for example) need to be defined; if one selects the most important ones the costs of monitoring the objects can be kept at a reasonable level and the results are sufficiently precise. The selfassessment data used in this paper turn out to be useful: Applying a sensitivity analysis, the results appear to be robust in many factors of the assessment. The critical assessed data are the maximum losses estimated. Estimation errors have a significant impact on the derived VaR and conditional VaR risk figures.
We have also shown that, besides extensive simulations, EVT offers a useful tool for obtaining operational risk measures. Surprisingly, temporal dependence of the events have a negligible impact on the results. Therefore, by and large, the Poisson process modelling the stochastic time of events realizations can be considered independent of the severities.
The models considered in this paper can be extended in various directions. First, if the Poisson models used are not appropriate, they can be replaced by a negative binomial process (see Ebnöther (2001) for details). Second, production processes are only a part of total workflow processes defining business activities. Hence, other processes need to modelled too and all pieces are then finally catenated using graph theory. This finally implies a comprehensive risk exposure for banking activities. Mean Standard Deviation Figure 7 : Robustness of the contribution of the single processes on the 95% VaR level. For each of the five sensitivity analyses the contribution of each process to the risk is calculated. Then the mean contribution over all five scenarios and the standard deviation are determined. The numbers on the horizontal axis are not the process numbers; they only numerate 25 out of the 103 processes with a sensitivity not smaller than 0.01 percent in the mean and the standard deviation.
